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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 21/01/2008 Accident number: 493 
Accident time: Not made available Accident Date: 02/06/2007 
Where it occurred: Tourkotal Village, 
Daman district, 
Kandahar Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Other (?) 
Class: other Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: hard 
metal fragments 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 21/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 
 
Accident report 
A letter about this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion 
to a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the 
letter is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text 
in [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if the full investigation report is made available in 
future. 
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LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY 
DEM ACCIDENT ON DEMINER OF [National demining agency] DT # 4  
AT TOURKOTAL VILLAGE, DAMAN DISTRICT OF KANDHAR PROVINCE 
ON 2nd  JUNE 2007 
[Letter undated] 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
On 2nd June 2007, a demining accident occurred to deminer of [National demining agency] 
named [the Victim] at MF # AF/2402/00000/MF192 located at Tourkotal village, Daman 
district of Kandahar province. As the involved deminer had used the PPE properly, he has not 
received any injuries.   
 
SUMMARY: 
According to the AMAC South investigation report, the deminer was tasked by Team 
Leader/Section Leader to clear a cross lane on a portion of the minefield heavily 
contaminated by fragments whilst required full excavation. As the detector indicated multiple 
signals, the deminer started excavation on the readings with a local made bayonet. 
Excavation was carried out about 30 cm without confirming the excavated area with metal 
detector. While excavating, the bayonet touched the mine’s pressure plate and was 
detonated.  
The ground was hard, excessive pressure might have been applied on the mine by the 
deminer. After the accident, it was observed that the area had not been excavated to the 
required depth and two additional signals were found undetected on the excavated portion.  
Fortunately, as the involved deminer had properly used PPE therefore received no injuries. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The investigation team concluded that the accident occurred because of the following 
reasons:  
1. The excavation drill was not practiced in accordance with the SOP because the 
deminer excavated forward up to 30 cm but did not use metal detector to check the 
excavated area; moreover, the depth of excavation was not properly maintained. 
2. Incorrect excavation drill is considered as one of the contributing factors to the 
accident.  
3. The section leader should have notified the deminer to use detector for re-confirming 
the signal’s exact location. 
4. This team had planned to go for mission leave on 30th May 2007 but suddenly the 
team’s mission duration had been extended for extra 10 days. Extension of the 
mission duration may have mentally stressed the deminer. 
 
 
2 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
1. Refresher training is recommended for the team members, concentrating on 
excavation drill. 
2. The agency should have properly planned the OPS mission and Leave mission for its 
teams and to communicate it to the respective teams in advance. 
3. Team’s command group to ensure that the deminers apply all the demining drills 
correctly, safely and systematically. 
 
Signed: Chief of Operations, UNMACA Kabul 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 655 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not appropriate Time to hospital: Not appropriate 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
COMMENT: Non-injurious accident. No medical report was needed. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the 
lessons learned included the fact that the Victim was not working to his SOPs and his errors 
were not corrected.  
The secondary cause is listed as “Other” because there is not enough information to assess 
the details surrounding this accident. 
This record will be revised if the full investigation report is made available in future. 
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